To look at the problem of untouchability under the light of Partition is paramount.
Dwaipayan Sen has shown how the links between Partition, caste and untouchability have been deeply understudied. 4 After seventy years, the historical knowledge of Dalit experiences in the years prior to Partition and its aftermath is very limited. 5 This gap may be explained in two ways. First, Partition has often been seen as a Hindu-Muslim (and sometimes Sikh)
conflict mainly restricted to specific regions of India. Studies covering this topic have privileged histories regarding the formation of two new countries. Similarly, there also has been an emphasis on how the violence associated with Partition shaped life in India and
Pakistan. This skewed vision has occluded the experiences of other religious and political groups that do not fit nicely into the Hindu-Muslim binary. 6 As noted by Urvashi Butalia, there is still plenty to be heard about Partition and the way it affected women, Christians and Dalits among others. 7 In recent years, however, the absence of caste in Partition studies has been addressed more directly by people like Gyanendra Pandey, Ravinder Kaur, Ramnarayan Rawat and Sekhar Bandyopadhyay. Pandey, for instance, has documented the violent experiences of Punjabi Dalits during Partition. In doing so, he has also challenged the common belief that Untouchable communities were not affected by the developments of 1947. 8 On her part, Ravider Kaur has shown how a 'master narrative' of Partition, often reflecting upper-caste views, has excluded the experiences of displacement felt by Dalit communities. 9 Finally, the work of Rawat has offered us an interesting account of the mobilisation of Dalit political groups against Congress in Uttar Pradesh from 1946-1948. 10 He argues that these grassroots politics challenge historical narratives sustaining that, after 1946, most of the Untouchable population had been integrated to the nationalist movement led by Congress. 11 All of these works have invaluable merit. They have provided new missing perspectives of a crucial historical event in India. However, these studies restrict their interest to Northern India. They also do not say much about the international and larger political implications of Partition towards Dalit politics. To complement rather than to challenge these studies, this article focuses on Ambedkar's efforts to secure political safeguards before the British left India. This article shows that the connections between untouchability and Partition were not restricted to specific regions of India but had international resonance.
The work of Bandyopadhyay deserves a space of its own. Bandyopadhyay has produced one of the most complete analysis on the relationship between Dalit politics and the transfer of power in India. Looking roughly at the same period covered by this article,
Bandyopadhyay argues that Ambedkar's 'electoral debacle' and continuous changes in politics during the pre-Partition years were due to a 'crisis'. 12 Bandyopadhyay attributes this crisis to three main reasons. First, Bandyopadhyay argues that one of 'the main thrust of the transfer of power was a process to depoliticize caste and push it into the social and religious domain'. 13 In his view, this process greatly affected Dalits and all other political minorities that were not politically defined by their religion as they would fall now under the 'General' constituency category. In other words, these groups were losing their specific political power once defended by the colonial administration. While some of this is true, the way Bandyopadhyay arrives to his conclusion is peculiar. That the British decided to withdraw any type of political support to Dalit groups was hardly an effort to 'depoliticize' caste. On the contrary, the transfer of power was an acknowledgement of Congress' political views on religion and the status quo of caste. There are plenty examples of this ranging from
Ambedkar's resignation from Nehru's government due to the debates surrounding the Hindu Code Bill, to the refusal of the Indian Government of giving any sort of reservations to Buddhist converts until the 1990s. In other words, the transfer of power had nothing to do with a 'depoliticization' of caste. It was just an acceptance of the normative view of caste. Dalits would be a perpetual minority. The fifth section covers Ambedkar's efforts to place untouchability as an international problem. New evidence is presented on Ambedkar's journey to England to meet with Churchill and his plans to present a complaint to the United Nations (UN). This is followed with an alternative interpretation on the reasons Ambedkar decided to join the Nehru government. Finally, I offer some concluding remarks.
Jinnah and Untouchability
The extensive political connections between Muslims and Dalits have received little attention from scholars. 16 The political history between the different communities in India was never 25 This text aimed to show Jinnah how a fair political system in a united
India could look like. Ambedkar's key argument was that political majorities in India should disappear both in practice and in theory. In this scheme, a community could not have more than 40 percent of the actual representation in any of the different legislatures. This would ban the perpetual ruling of majorities throughout the country. That is, in order to approve any type of legislation, the majority would have to make an alliance with at least one of the minorities. In the same way, if all the minorities joined together, they would be able to confront the politics of the largest community. This meant that the political system would change constantly and communal views would eventually disappear in favour of shared political objectives. This arrangement would also give Dalits a privileged position in Indian politics as they were the third largest community in the country. Thus, Ambedkar envisioned
Dalits as a political force that could shift their alliances according to specific circumstances.
This text constructs an alternative imagination of the Indian political space. Ambedkar's proposal of eliminating political majorities would also appeal to other 'multicultural nations'
in which a dominant group monopolises politics at the expense of other minorities. However, the small caveat in Ambedkar's plan was that Muslims and Jinnah needed to accept living as a minority in a Hindu country.
As expected, Ambedkar's proposals were not welcomed. Congress rejected his plan as they didn't want to renounce to their majority status. The protests also demanded evidence that Congress was committed to the protection of Dalits. 31 Second, Ambedkar demanded the creation of separate settlements to relocate Dalits within India as a way to escape caste oppression. 32 Third, Ambedkar tried to secure political representation for his followers by framing untouchability as an international problem. On the one hand, he threatened the British by suggesting that he would make a formal complaint to the UN about the injustices committed against Dalits. On the other, Ambedkar contacted
Winston Churchill to delay independence until some safeguards for his people were secured.
Together, the different strategies used by Ambedkar show how Partition elicited a series of changes at a national and international level in the politics around untouchability. These strategies also show that Ambedkar's movement was organised and that they were able to pressure the government in several ways. Finally, that Ambedkar was willing to explore every possible political alliance at this time, except compromising with Congress, says a lot about the broadness of his political imagination.
Satyagrahas, Separate Electorates and the Poona Pact
On 15 July 1946, six members of the SCF entered the Council Hall compound in Poona to protest the Cabinet Mission's proposal for India. They carried black flags and shouted slogans of 'Down with British Imperialism'; 'Down with Congress'; and 'Scrap the Poona Pact'. 33 After this group was arrested, two more batches followed. The first one was composed of eight women. In the second batch there were six men. These protesters were also arrested at the entrance of the compound wall. Simultaneously to the arrests, a Ramnarayan Rawat has shown, the protest proved that the Federation had some political force in Congress enclaves. 42 The most important protests were held in Poona, Lucknow and Klan and of the Jews by the Nazis is less heinous than the sufferings of the Scheduled Castes who were subjected to in the name of religion, caste and the like by the Hindus. It is nothing but a slow poisoning to us'. 46 These reports show us that through their own press, the Dalit movement was reaching people far beyond the places of the satyagrahas. They also show that certain political guidelines were being spread by the SCF to consolidate their protest as a united Pan-Indian movement. Finally, the account provided by Jai Bheem also illustrates that Ambedkar's followers adopted the language of internationalism and human rights that was in vogue at the time.
The satyagrahas ended abruptly when P.N. Rajbhoj was arrested in April 1947. He was convicted and sentenced to six months imprisonment for defying the U.P. District
Magistrate's ban on processions and causing apprehension of breach of peace. 47 While these satyagrahas are largely a forgotten episode in Indian history, they were highly organised political protests. In the end, these satyagrahas allowed Ambedkar to put some pressure on the British and Congress. This would eventually help him secure a place in Nehru's new government. Of course, as stated before, the satyagrahas were part of a larger plan to secure safeguards for Dalits. Another element of this strategy was Ambedkar's demand for separate settlements for his people.
Ambedkar and Separate Settlements
The campaign for separate settlements came along with other demands against the Cabinet 
Churchill and Untouchability as an International Problem
In 1946 Ambedkar's idea to take the case of Dalits to the United Nations was not a coincidence. It was a timely and careful plan that responded to the turbulent period at the end of WWII. As a recognition of its efforts during the War, India was given an independent seat in the United Nations and was considered a founding member of the organisation in 1945.
While it was still a British colony, India took advantage of its membership to present concerns to the General Assembly in the very first session of 1946. 59 At this time, India made a formal complaint against South Africa for discriminating against Indian nationals. The core of the problem was that Jan Smuts' administration planned to pass the South African Asiatic
Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act. This bill restricted the purchase of land to Indian nationals to specific areas. 60 The Indian representation to the UN claimed that the 'Ghetto Law' was a contradiction to the human rights of the Indian minority. They highlighted that the Act contradicted the principles defended by Jan Smuts in the preamble of the UN Charter in 1945. 61 On his part, Jan Smuts claimed that the bill was a domestic matter in which the UN had no right to interfere. Despite Smuts' reluctance, the UN demanded an end of discrimination and a called for bilateral talks. When Smuts refused to abolish the act, India suspended the commercial agreements it had with South Africa.
Ambedkar, always with an eye on international affairs, saw the inherent contradiction Ambedkar's intention to go to the UN was taken more seriously after Smuts'
comments. The British Foreign Office opened a file to follow the complaints of the SCF to the United Nations. The British were worried that Ambedkar could hurt their fragile relationship with India. They were worried that with Smuts on his side, Ambedkar could introduce a motion to present his case to the UN. 64 Thinking ahead of time, the British modelled a reply to obstruct Ambedkar's future demands. In a surprising shift of attitude, the Foreign Office constructed their argument against Ambedkar on the same basis as Congress.
In fact, the British took a reply written by Rajagopalachari, the conservative Congressman, as a model to dismiss Ambedkar's claims. 65 The Foreign Office argued that in contrast to the South African case, the question of untouchability was not legally sanctioned. That is, untouchability was a religious and a social issue, rather than legal or political. The British also claimed that Dalits were not even a proper minority. This was the position defended by
Gandhi and Congress, who saw Dalits as an integral part of the Hindu community. 66 The recognition of Dalits as a political community was crucial in this debate. If they failed to gain recognition, the UN had no grounds to intervene as the problem would be considered a national matter. 67 It goes without saying that this was a complete reversal of the policies the the Muslims themselves and they too will begin to think that a United India is better even for them. 84 These words were received with cheers and applause. They marked a significant shift in Rather than an act of good faith from Gandhi and Nehru, Ambedkar's incorporation to the new government responded to mere political calculations. This is also evident in his writings. In a letter to A.V. Alexander, the British Labour politician, Ambedkar revealed to him that people 'who know the mind of the Congress' had approached him to broker a deal.
Ambedkar was informed that 'if he was prepared to accept joint electorates, the Congress on its part would be quite prepared to concede all other demands'. 90 Ambedkar explained to
Alexander that such agreement would be futile as without separate electorates, Dalits would be a perpetual political minority. However, as I have shown, Ambedkar joined the government only until he was out of options to secure any type of safeguards for Dalits. In
Ambedkar's words:
It is a very deep game. Realising that there is no escape from giving the Untouchables some safeguards, the Congress wants to find out some way by which it can make them of no effect. It is in the system of joint electorates that the Congress sees an instrument of making the safeguards of no effect. That is why the Congress is insisting upon joint electorates. For joint electorates means giving the Untouchables office without power. 91 Not surprisingly, after Partition, the questions of separate electorates disappeared from the debating 
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This stance highlights once again Ambedkar's political readjustment at this time.
His refusal to support the Nizam is strange as the Princely States were also trying to revalidate the agreements they had made with the British before they left India. Thus, Ambedkar was reflecting the official policy of making state sovereignty one of the key objectives of the newly independent country. 97 Furthermore, when Ambedkar decided to be more critical of Congress's administration, Nehru did not hesitate to establish his authority.
For example, in 1948, Ambedkar gave a speech in Lucknow explaining to his followers why he had joined the government. The press reported that the speech was hostile to Congress.
When Nehru found out, he demanded a retraction from Ambedkar. Nehru explained that being part of the Cabinet meant having 'a certain goodwill towards the Congress or at least and avoidance of anything that might be construed as an attack on the Congress'. 2 I use the anachronistic term Dalit throughout the essay except when in quotation. As a general rule, the term Untouchable was used throughout the twentieth century. Before 1935, the term used by the government to refer to these groups was 'Depressed Classes'. After 1935, the category Scheduled Castes was coined and has been in use in official matters since then.
For a discussion on Ambedkar's main criticism against the Indian village see Chairez-Garza, 'Touching Space'.
